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Community Organizations in the Foreclosure Crisis: The Failure of Neoliberal Civil Society 
Michael McQuarrie1 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the prehistory of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland, Ohio in order to understand the 
effectiveness of civil-society organizations in mitigating its impact on the city’s neighborhoods. Social theorists and 
movement activists have often postulated civil society as an authentic and voluntaristic realm in which we constitute 
and act on shared values. The voluntary nature of civil society organizations also, it is argued, make them more 
responsive, adaptable, and effective in meeting the needs of the communities they operate in. The question is 
whether or not this has held true in the contemporary crisis. I find that in the 1970s Cleveland’s community-based 
organizations were instrumental in securing resources from government and private philanthropies to deal with the 
urban crisis. The unintended result of this success was a general rationalization of Cleveland’s civil society around 
narrow practices and market-based conceptions of value. In the process, civil society was transformed into a 
political technology that solved various dilemmas of rule, but at the same time it was transformed into a civic 
monoculture that made the city especially vulnerable to foreclosure. A key implication of this analysis is that civil 
society has been transformed into an object and stake of urban politics and, as a result, it should not be expected to 
protect society against neoliberal institutional transformations.  
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In the 1970s, many cities in the Northeast and the Midwest were confronted with a crisis. 
Redlining, neighborhood transition, and suburban growth interacted with the decline of 
American manufacturing to produce a general neighborhood crisis. Faced with vacancies, 
foreclosures, arson, and diminished city services, neighborhoods revolted. Unlike the riots of the 
1960s, the revolt was nonviolent and transcended race. Community organizing groups were 
active in helping spur the creation of a movement to secure greater investment in urban 
neighborhoods. A related goal of the movement was to re-embed markets in society, to borrow 
Polanyi’s construction, that is, subordinate market logics to social ones.1 One prominent result of 
this activism was the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA, 1977), a rare piece of 
legislation that limits the mobility of capital. Also indicative of the prominence of neighborhood 
issues at the time, President Carter organized a “neighborhood summit” to develop a more 
responsive neighborhood policy. Communities across the United States learned to organize for 
improvements in neighborhood well-being, an explosion in activism that the political scientist 
Harry Boyte called the “Backyard Revolution.”2 
 The passage of CRA and a renewed interest in neighborhood policy were not the only 
effects of the urban crisis. Government functions were shifted from state bureaucracies to 
neighborhood-based nonprofit organizations, transforming the organizational structure of urban 
governance.3 Central to the process was a new breed of community organization focused on 
physical redevelopment, the community development corporation (CDC). While CDCs initially 
emerged in the 1960s, they were given a tremendous boost in the 1970s as vehicles for 
neighborhood self-determination in land-use decisions and as recipients of Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) and philanthropic funds.4 For neighborhood activists, 
politicians, and philanthropists, CDCs became useful tools for protecting neighborhoods from 
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the depredations of the market. However, rather than limit the negative effects of markets in 
neighborhoods, I argue that these organizations helped pave the way for the foreclosure crisis 
that began in 2007. This role suggests that we must overcome the romanticization of civil society 
if we are to effectively analyze neoliberal institutions.5 To understand this dynamic it is 
necessary to look at the transformation of urban civil society and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) between the Backyard Revolution and the foreclosure crisis. 
 Between 1975 and 2007 CDCs would proliferate across the urban landscape. Indeed, 
according to censuses taken by the National Congress for Community Economic Development, 
the nationwide population of CDCs more than tripled from fifteen hundred to forty-six hundred 
between 1988 and 2005.6 Alongside this prolific growth has been the emergence of new 
intermediary and support organizations as well as a variety of policy tools that make use of these 
now-prevalent organizations. CDCs are cornerstones of many public-private partnerships. They 
are often components of career trajectories in local politics and they have the backing of many 
local and national foundations.  
The rise of CDCs as necessary components of neighborhood voice and governance has 
been celebrated as a Tocquevillian renaissance in which non-instrumental social relations 
produce social capital, a crucial ingredient in promoting collective action for the common good.7 
These collective investments in neighborhood-based organizations have expanded local “civic 
capacity,” according to Sirianni and Friedland. Community developers have created innovative 
and adaptive housing interventions while facilitating and empowering neighborhood voices.8 
Indeed, some have characterized community development as a unified “movement” that manages 
to integrate the logics of state, market and civil society while empowering neighborhoods and 
facilitating “social repair”.9  
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Based on much of the relevant literature, the explosion in CBOs would suggest that urban 
neighborhoods would be far better prepared to cope with the foreclosure crisis of 2007 than they 
were in 1973 to cope with the earlier urban crisis. However, that has not been the case. The 
experience of Cleveland, Ohio is suggestive on this point. Cleveland is a city that is armed with a 
large number of (CBOs) as well as an effective and well-supported community development 
system, and yet it was one of the hardest-hit cities in the foreclosure crisis. This begs the 
question: do CBOs actually arm neighborhoods with the resources, tools, and expertise needed to 
cope with foreclosures? Because it relies on a counterfactual question: what would have 
happened without a large population of community-based organizations, this is a difficult 
question to address directly. However, it is possible to establish a tendential argument by looking 
at the structure and trajectory of the city’s civil society in the period between the Backyard 
Revolution and the foreclosure crisis. This approach makes visible the changing organization of 
opportunity and constraint in the city’s civil society. Based on this, and running against the grain 
of many contemporary celebrations of the emancipatory and policy potential of civil-society 
organizations,10 I argue that these organizations have come to weigh on neighborhoods rather 
than empower them. This, in turn, produces a second question: how did this set of circumstances 
come to pass? Why has the privileging of civil-society organizations in urban governance proven 
to be ineffective in confronting the contemporary crisis?  
 By focusing on the case of Cleveland, a city that was a “bellweather”11 of the foreclosure 
crisis and that possesses a nationally-recognized community development “industry system,”12 I 
demonstrate how the genesis of this field of nonprofit organizations has hampered the city’s 
response to the crisis. In order to excavate the causes of this outcome it is necessary to look at the 
transformation of Cleveland’s civil society between 1970 and 2008. Central to this story is the 
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increasing “instrumentalization” of these organizations, by which I mean their use to achieve the 
ends of organized urban interests. As CBOs are transformed in order to realize narrow 
instrumental goals, their ability to be responsive to the communities they ostensibly represent is 
compromised. In terms of civil society writ large, instrumentalization undermines the diversity of 
civil society as a result of selection processes and, in a few cases, overt channeling efforts by 
funders. What had been a diverse field of civil-society organizations in the 1970s, eventually 
became a civic monoculture. Like crop monocultures in agriculture, a civic monoculture 
undermines the ability of the city to respond to an environmental shock, in this case, the 
foreclosure crisis.13  
 Despite the ecological framing of this analysis, this is not merely a story of passive 
selection processes.14 Philanthropies, institutional entrepreneurs, and CBOs themselves 
attempted to secure their own authority by devaluing alternative organizational and 
programmatic models. By 2000, the effectiveness of organizations was being measured largely in 
terms of the production or facilitation of new housing and other physical development. This did 
not simply mean that organizations were using the wrong tools for an emerging problem, it also 
meant that other programmatic muscles were allowed to atrophy. When mass foreclosures struck 
the city, the abilities of the city’s civil-society organizations were poorly calibrated to the 
problem.  
 Analytically and theoretically, this process reveals the risks of treating civil society as a 
sector with inherent characteristics to be unproblematically harnessed by policy makers and 
philanthropies. Rather than being a diverse and voluntaristic expression of non-instrumental 
values and altruism, over the past forty years Cleveland’s civil society was transformed into a 
political technology.15 By political technology I mean a bundling of practices, discourses, 
6 
 
metrics, and tools which serve to bridge rigid political divisions. Establishing such a technology 
was a goal with very high stakes in Cleveland in the 1970s and 1980s. In order to govern the city 
at all it had become necessary to construct new accommodations and new practices of 
governance. The political technology of community development accomplished the former by 
shifting governance functions to CBOs and constructing institutions to facilitate physical 
redevelopment. It accomplished the latter by using real-estate values as the most important 
metric for assessing neighborhood well-being. This technology managed to bridge the divisions 
that had emerged between elected politicians, corporate leaders, and neighborhood activists. 
Because of its service as a political technology, community development became a “morally-
magnetic mission”, to borrow from Nina Eliasoph, or a cause that was indisputably attractive and 
good to a variety of urban interests.16 At the same time, use of CBOs as a political technology 
prompted funders, politicians, and community developers to rationalize the city’s civil society 
around a narrow set of practices and goals. Organizations, programs, and practices that did not 
contribute to the political technology were starved of resources and, over time, marginalized or 
eliminated from the city’s civil society. 
This analysis of the relationship between Cleveland’s CBOs and the foreclosure crisis is a 
component of a broader study of the structure and genesis of the field of community-based 
organizations in Cleveland. I analyze these shifts using a variety of sources including interviews 
with the leaders of every CBO in the city between 2000 and 2008 and archival research on the 
city’s CBOs dating back to 1966. The focus was on CBOs that claim to represent a 
geographically-defined community or neighborhood, that receive funding from one of a variety 
of sources, and/or that are members of the local community development trade association. 
Overall, the analysis is based on seventy-one organizations that were extant in the city between 
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1970 and 2008. I also conducted dozens of interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, program 
officers, strategic business organizations, and economic development organizations to 
understand the institutional context. Cleveland is not a representative case, but a revelatory one. 
In particular, the presence of a large and professionalized population of CBOs alongside an 
exceptionally devastating foreclosure crisis makes Cleveland a case that places these dynamics 
into unusually sharp relief even as it reveals how the instrumentalization of civil society can 
produce unresponsive and ineffective civic monocultures.  
The analysis here opens with a discussion of the construction of the political technology 
of community development in the wake of the Backyard Revolution. I then turn to a description 
of the community development “industry system” that had emerged by the mid-1990s with the 
support of a variety of urban constituencies. In section three I answer the question of what went 
wrong and describe the rationalization the city’s civil society into a civic monoculture 
disconnected from neighborhood residents and problems. Finally, I turn to the paralysis of 
Cleveland’s civic monoculture in the face of the city’s worst crisis in forty years.  
 
1. Contention and Accommodation in the Neighborhood Crisis of the 1970s 
The instrumentalization of civil society and the construction of a new political technology 
based on community-based organizations was an outcome of a general collapse of political 
authority in the city. A combination of fiscal crisis, populist politics, capital strike, recall 
election, and protest movements has made Cleveland a paradigmatic case of the “crisis of growth 
politics”.17 In this political boiling cauldron the primary mobilized constituencies—
neighborhood organizations, growth-oriented elites, and elected politicians—were each fighting 
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with the other two. While contentious politics was the most visible effect of the crisis, a less 
visible outcome was that it became evident to philanthropies, bureaucrats, and a cohort of 
community organizers that community-based housing production could be the basis of a new 
political accommodation. Though assisted by others, many community organizers became the 
“institutional entrepreneurs”18 that fashioned a new community-development industry system 
based on community development corporations (CDCs). They altered the meaning of community 
development to meet a variety of goals, invented new policy tools, and created a new regulatory 
apparatus to facilitate community-based real-estate development. The system that was created 
bridged the particular interests of all of the contending constituencies in the 1970s. As such, the 
political technology of community development was not imposed by one interest on others. Nor 
was it a simple appropriation of a model that had been developed elsewhere. Instead, early 
community developers made use of their knowledge of varying institutional logics to adopt 
policy tools and development practices to the specific needs of community-based housing 
production in Cleveland. In doing so they helped realize the interests of politicians, growth-
oriented elites, and neighborhoods. The value of the emerging system was its ability to secure 
political peace in the context of urban decline.  
There were three key events that resolved the crisis of growth politics in Cleveland. First 
was the election of the business-friendly Republican, George Voinovich (1979-1988). Unlike his 
predecessor, Dennis Kucinich (1977-1979), a self-styled urban populist, Voinovich was happy to 
devolve authority and governance functions onto new civil-society organizations. The resulting 
accommodation between elected politicians and the neighborhood-based movement enabled 
Voinovich to recommit to the politics of growth. Some city resources would be allocated to 
neighborhoods and funneled through CBOs, but the bulk would go for economic development in 
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support of existing concentrated real-estate investments in University Circle and the central 
business district. These priorities in allocating resources rebuilt the relationship between 
politicians and growth-oriented elites. This accommodation has been supported by every mayor 
since. Mike White’s administration (1990-2001) built much of the institutional apparatus 
necessary for nonprofit physical redevelopment to thrive. While she did little to alter the 
arrangements ceded by the White administration, Jane Campbell’s (2002-2006) trajectory to the 
mayoralty went through an East Side CDC. Finally, Frank Jackson is perhaps the least-
enthusiastic supporter of the system, but there were few alternative outlets for funding by the 
time he became mayor in 2006 and he has historically given generous support to the CDC in the 
ward that launched his political career.  
The second relevant factor that resulted in community-based physical redevelopment 
becoming a new political technology was the emergence of a more interventionist and proactive 
corporate leadership. Corporate elites needed to reestablish their civic credentials after staging a 
destructive capital strike against Kucinich in 1977. They formed Cleveland Tomorrow, a dues-
financed strategic business organization, to implement institutional reforms necessary to restart 
economic growth, an agenda that included nonprofit-based neighborhood redevelopment.19 This 
commitment acknowledged the role of CBOs in governance and committed private resources to 
physical redevelopment in neighborhoods as well as downtown. In general, the turn to 
community-based development was the basis of a new political accommodation while 
simultaneously producing a turn to “public-private partnerships” and other forms of 
collaboration in governance. This transformation effectively enrolled, or “channeled”, 
neighborhood-based nonprofits into an effort to revalorize local real estate.20 While the effects 
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were not immediate, this reorganization of opportunities and constraints initiated tendencies in 
the city’s civil society that would continue until the foreclosure crisis.  
Third, the neighborhood movement was defeated. In 1982 an umbrella group for 
Cleveland’s neighborhood organizations disrupted a spring gala of the social elite of the city in 
an effort to force a dialogue with the CEO of a locally-based oil company. Known as the “Hunt 
Club” action, the protest managed to offend enough people that philanthropies informed the 
community organizations that they were cutting off all funding for community organizing and, 
henceforth, would only fund “bricks and mortar” development. This divided the movement. 
Some viewed it as a coercive repression of neighborhood voices, while others took advantage of 
new resources and collaborative possibilities to rebuild neighborhoods. After all, some parts of 
the movement had already come to view abandoned homes, not corporate elites, as “Public 
Enemy Number One,” and were coming to view their own organizations as “developers of last 
resort.”21 As early as 1981 the Cleveland Housing Network was formed as a cooperative that 
would facilitate housing production in partnership with member CBOs.22 The Network, in turn, 
would be instrumental in the institutional transformation that would enable community-based 
housing production. Neighborhood investment and recovery was always a goal of the movement 
and it had basically been acknowledged as a priority by philanthropic funders and the City. 
Finally, building out the new community development industry system presented the opportunity 
to make significant institutional reforms in the city. Indeed, today, many positions of leadership 
in the city are occupied by one-time leaders of the neighborhood movement.  
Chris Warren is probably the most notable example. As an organizer with the Tremont 
West Development Corporation in the 1970s, Warren had led fights against arsonists and 
slumlords. In 1982, he became CHN’s second director and oversaw its growth as a key node in 
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the emerging community development industry system. In 1989, he joined Mike White’s 
administration as Director of Community Development. In that capacity he worked to develop 
government support for nonprofit physical redevelopment by helping create a land bank, a 
housing trust fund, tax abatements for new housing, and local CRA agreements with area banks. 
After a stint directing the Cleveland office of a Chicago-based development bank, Warren joined 
Frank Jackson’s administration in 2006 in the cabinet-level post of Director of Regional 
Development. Warren’s trajectory is not unusual. His partner, Linda Hudecek, had a similar 
trajectory from organizing, to city government in the White administration, to another 
development intermediary, NPI. Mark McDermott went from organizing, to Cleveland State, to 
director of CHN, to the Enterprise Foundation, a national development intermediary and 
financing organization. Today, he is the Midwest regional director of Enterprise. These are just a 
few examples of a larger cohort of institutional entrepreneurs that has reshaped local institutions 
to facilitate community-based, nonprofit physical redevelopment.  
Contentious politics disappeared from Cleveland in the wake of the city’s crisis of 
authority. A new accommodation had been reached, one that valorized the role of nonprofit 
community-based organizations. While many neighborhood activists felt that the new generation 
of CDCs represented a cooptation of movement organizations, it is also true that they realized 
some goals of the movement, especially the rescaling of governance to the neighborhood scale 
and new investment in neighborhood physical capital. For politicians and bureaucrats, 
community-based nonprofit organizations helped govern neighborhoods in a tight fiscal 
environment while also providing a closer connection to neighborhood stakeholders. For 
politicians, the CDCs provided an opportunity to secure organizational adherents that sustain a 
neighborhood electoral operation—a process facilitated by City Council’s control over much of 
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the Community Development Block Grant budget.23 For the city’s corporate elites physical 
redevelopment helped realize the goal of revalorizing the city’s real estate generally, while also 
making the city more attractive for corporate managers and professionals. When combined with 
new legislative (CRA, various tax credit and homeownership programs) and philanthropic 
innovation (including program-related investments, new professionalizing intermediary 
organizations, lease-purchase housing rehabilitation programs, and tax-credit syndication), 
neighborhood-based housing production became a tool for a general political accommodation.  
In the wake of the Backyard Revolution community development was transformed into a 
political technology. This was accomplished by institutional entrepreneurs, philanthropic 
funders, intermediary organizations and bureaucrats who managed to equate community 
development with capital-intensive physical redevelopment designed to raise real-estate values. 
This technology was valued because it enabled the construction of a civic agenda out of disparate 
interests and priorities—a task that was especially important in Cleveland after the crisis of the 
1970s. In the hands of CBOs, intermediary organizations, city agencies, and philanthropic 
funders, the technology organizes the identities and commitments of Clevelanders by situating 
itself as an elegant technical solution to a host of governance problems in neighborhoods. 
Politically, this was an important basis of accommodation because it reversed the anti-market 
critique of the Backyard Revolution that had produced CRA; indeed, the valorization of real 
estate had been resituated as the solution to neighborhood problems and metric of neighborhood 
well-being.  
This configuration is notably “neoliberal” in that markets, in this case real-estate markets, 
are used to disrupt and reconfigure basic lines of political division while reconstituting ideas of 
the civic around ownership, participation, and individual responsibility in opposition to 
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dependence, transience, and tolerance. It clarifies and rationalizes interests around physical 
redevelopment. Of course, in many ways this was anticipated by the growth politics described by 
Logan and Molotch.24 What is new here is the work being done by real-estate values to meet 
everyone’s collective interests and how the pursuit of real-estate values is being led by civil-
society organizations rather than private developers and corporate elites, all in a context of 
decline. Where once city bureaucracies and nonprofits had defined needs and then responded to 
them, the only needs that were generally acknowledged in the years before the foreclosure crisis 
were those that could be met through higher real-estate values. This tendential shift enabled and 
justified the collective investment in CDCs as a cure-all solution to urban problems, securing for 
it moral authority that was difficult to contest, even at the height of the foreclosure crisis.  
Growth was not restarted despite the resources and reforms that were directed to 
community-based physical redevelopment. While many and frequent announcements of 
Cleveland’s recovery have been trumpeted since the 1970s, the city has continued to lose jobs, 
corporate headquarters, and population (from nearly a million in 1970 down to 380 thousand 
today). However, authority had been reestablished and since the early 1980s decline has not been 
associated with political polarization. Growth-oriented elites have acknowledged that 
neighborhood stabilization is important for economic development, politicians have learned to 
coexist with CBOs that claim to be more authentic representatives of community, and 
bureaucrats are happy to fund CDCs to provide governance functions that were once performed 
by government agencies. The population of CDCs rode a wave of legitimacy and funding to a 
peak of fifty-five in 1996, even as community-organizing groups died. This expansion is not 
because CDCs were instrumental in spurring growth, nor was it because they were effective 
representatives of neighborhoods—after all, many neighborhood activists felt betrayed by the 
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turn to physical development. The reason is that CBOs became necessary components of a 
political technology that enabled both a compromise among competing urban interests as well as 
a proactive mode of governance on behalf of those interests. CBOs had been instrumentalized as 
the key nodes of a new political technology and, at the same time, this role provided the center of 
gravity for the expansion of a new community development industry system and for the 
rationalization of the city’s civil society.  
 
2. The Community Development Industry System 
Neighborhood-based institutional entrepreneurs accomplished a nifty inversion in the 
early 1980s. Faced with the defeat of their movement, they not only managed to ensure the 
survival of many CBOs, they transformed them into important nodes of urban governance and a 
necessary political technology for grounding urban political authority in a context of decline. The 
task for CBOs went from being one of securing recognition for neighborhoods and their needs to 
reforming institutions and developing tools that would enable the city’s CBOs to continue to 
function as a political technology. At the same time, this problem was not solved through 
consensus. Instead, many of the battles that had been waged publicly in the 1970s shifted indoors 
and were waged to define the meaning and practice of community development.  
In this context, it is not surprising that the population of CBOs grew rapidly. When the 
Cleveland Housing Network was formed in 1981 there were nineteen CBOs active in the city. In 
1996, the year the CBO population peaked, there were fifty-one. What were these organizations? 
Most basically, they were relatively small, professionally-run organizations receiving funding 
from some mix of developer’s fees, philanthropic funding, government funding (from the City 
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and the Councilor), and member dues. Their budgets averaged around seven hundred thousand 
dollars, though the largest had operating budgets in the millions. On average, they employed nine 
staff, most of whom would be involved in either ward programs or physical redevelopment. 
Almost all of the organizations were doing physical development, though in a variety of different 
ways depending on organizational culture, inter-organizational connections and neighborhood 
circumstances. Many CDCs work collaboratively with CHN, strike deals with private 
developers, or use programs sponsored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(mostly low-income housing tax credit projects or HOPE VI). Some have developed shopping 
centers, greenways, ecologically-innovative green developments, and cultural amenities.  
The CDC is an organizational form that began to receive attention from policy makers in 
the 1960s as a tool for neighborhoods to bootstrap themselves out of decline. In the wake of 
civil-rights victories, they were sometimes used to funnel resources to African-American 
communities. However, they were probably most significant as an organizational tool of urban 
recovery that was heavily touted and supported by the Ford Foundation and its community 
development financing arm, Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), between 1964 and 
2000. Ford developed many early tools to aid community-based physical redevelopment 
including program-related investments, which allowed philanthropies to invest in nonprofit-
sponsored developments. Philanthropies generally situated CDCs as a positive and civil way of 
achieving neighborhood renewal and empowerment, which also provided an alternative to the 
sort of contentious organizing that had been prominent in Cleveland in the 1970s. This approach 
to community-based physical redevelopment is encapsulated in the book Comeback Cities, by 
Paul Grogan, a former director of LISC, and Tony Proscio, a consultant and former LISC staffer. 
Situating themselves in a long tradition of thinking on community development, Grogan and 
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Proscio argue that attempting to eliminate poverty is a bad way to improve neighborhoods. What 
is needed is “a careful restoration of order—in the built environment, in public spaces, and in 
people’s lives.”25 For Grogan and Proscio, the role of the CDC is not so much to represent the 
community, but to “steer clear of the… us-versus-them ideology that mired grassroots groups for 
decades,” and to prime the pump of real-estate markets through supply-side interventions.  
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), passed by the Nixon 
Administration as the primary tool for Federal funds to reach poor urban communities, 
introduced its own public-sector logic into the rise of the CDC. The block grant mechanism was 
designed to outflank municipal politicians who might divert federal funds to support their own 
electoral operations, rather than meet real urban needs. In order to make this happen, CDBG 
funds are distributed to nonprofit organizations that aim to help neighborhoods. The idea was to 
put distance between elected officials and the expenditure of funds. However, the effect has often 
been that municipal politicians establish their own CBOs to receive CDBG funds while still 
pursuing electoral goals (Marwell 2007). In Cleveland, the City’s Department of Community 
Development controlled some of the city’s CDBG allocation (much of it distributed to CDCs on 
an equitable basis), but the rest was allocated equally to City Councilors to distribute in their 
wards. In some cases, Councilors established CDCs in order to retain control over their 
allocation.  
The varying circumstances around the founding and funding of CDCs do produce 
variations in practice. Politicized organizations make heavy use of a variety of government 
programs and contracts and have close relationships with ward political clubs. CDCs that grew 
out of merchant’s associations are heavily involved in street beautification, infrastructure issues, 
and commercial development. The CDCs that are the legacies of the Congresses are often closely 
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tied to street clubs, privilege neighborhood input, and are heavily focused on housing 
development. Notably, in 1990, even though community organizing groups had been eliminated 
from the city’s civil society, there was still considerable diversity among CDCs, diversity that 
might have helped the population adapt to environmental shocks like mass foreclosure. However, 
the diversity also produced conflicts over the definition of authoritative practices and 
organizational identities, which often determined funding.  
These conflicts were often most visible within wards, simply because it was there that the 
most direct competition over deals and funding took place. In 2000, in the African-American 
neighborhood of Hough, for example, there was a CDC that was an extension of the Councilor’s 
ward operation, one that was a legacy of the Congresses and still represented neighborhood 
residents against politicians and developers, a large-scale housing producer founded by a 
Catholic nun, and a large organization working on infrastructure and economic development 
issues that was founded by one of the city’s wealthiest industrialists. While there was not 
competition between them for all sources of funds, there was for many, namely for private 
philanthropic funds and for the Councilor’s CDBG allocation. Moreover, with the Councilor in a 
position to approve or deny many projects, rent-seeking behavior is common. However, rather 
than bribes being the lubricant of deal making, developer’s fees are. The Councilor in Hough, for 
example, has required that organizations give the CDC she was allied with a cut of the 
developer’s fees they earn in exchange for project approval. Political rent, indeed politicization 
writ large, is severely frowned upon by more “professional” development organizations and by 
the institutional entrepreneurs that came out of the neighborhood movement. These tensions 
motivate efforts to establish authoritative criteria of sound community development, criteria 
which are then used to distribute resources. Over the last thirty years, this process has produced a 
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growing consensus that has even come to include most City Councilors. The effect of this is that 
funding for CBOs has become tied to a monochrome programmatic palatte, while recalcitrant 
organizations have been starved of resources and have died off or been merged into other 
organizations.  
Despite diverse origins and distinct organizational logics and practices, most CDCs were 
moving towards relatively common programmatic practices. For example, most CBOs 
administer a host of ward programs funded by city government, including loans for improving 
storefronts or weatherizing homes and subsidies for heating costs or home repainting. Far more 
notable, however, is that almost all CBOs are involved in physical redevelopment, even if they 
do not always pursue it for the same reasons. While all CBOs emphasize the importance of 
improving real-estate values—after all, disinvestment was the primary cause of neighborhood 
decline in the first place—for some CDCs which I call technocratic, housing production is the 
primary marker of skill and capacity for their funders. Other CDCs, which I call clientelist, use 
housing production to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Councilor or as a tool for providing 
jobs and favors to potential political supporters. Nonetheless, despite these differences, when 
Cleveland’s CBOs are compared to those in cities like Atlanta and Seattle, where research was 
also conducted for this study, Cleveland’s CDC population is unusual in its broad-based focus on 
housing. But this commonality should not cause us to overlook the mutability of physical 
redevelopment, making it amenable to organizations that pursue very different goals. The 
prominent role of physical redevelopment in CDC programming was easily coupled to the 
adoption of real-estate values as a metric for assessing CDCs and neighborhoods.    
Programmatically, the use of real-estate values for measuring neighborhood health 
implies that physical redevelopment will be the privileged programmatic activity for CDCs. 
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While physical development can meet the need for new housing, improve real-estate values, and 
“prime the pump” of real-estate markets to attract private investment, many argue that it serves a 
variety of other purposes as well, such as the reduction of crime and pulling people out of 
poverty. Depending on who is asked, it can secure community development, racial 
empowerment, individual affluence, and neighborhood quality of life. Physical redevelopment is 
a blank policy canvas on which any number of actors and organizations can paint their vision of 
a revitalized Cleveland. This fungibility is why physical redevelopment is the ideal basis for the 
political technology of community development.  
While useful to many politicians and neighborhood advocates, Cleveland’s community 
development industry system generally empowered technocrats, expert in physical 
redevelopment and urban planning, as the representatives of community interests.26 In terms of a 
worldview, technocracy implies a faith in professional management, technical problem-solving 
and assumes that the application of rationality will yield politically unimpeachable solutions.27 
The vibrant counterpublic that had been activated as neighborhoods mobilized in the 1970s was 
replaced by experts who manipulate the relevant measure of neighborhood well-being: real-
estate values. Development can be used as a way of strategically introducing market dynamics in 
order to make the hold of blight more tenuous—it is, then, a rationalist application of the market 
to solve a particular problem. This becomes evident when CDC directors speak of using different 
tools, such as LIHTC-funded housing or market-rate developments to target a variety of different 
populations or to deal with the particular problems of different land parcels. The strategic 
deployment of development tools is enabled by an objectifying gaze that is manifested in land 
use maps and strategic plans. Cleveland’s CDCs are able to tactically deploy solutions to 
problems, not at the scale of the city or the neighborhood, but at the scale of the individual lot in 
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order to revalorize urban real estate. It is this fine-grained manipulation of real-estate markets in 
difficult and diverse settings that is the central contribution of CDCs to broader redevelopment 
agendas. Community developers argue that these efforts are an important cause of the jump in 
median sales prices of houses from thirty-thousand dollars in 1980 to seventy-two thousand in 
2004. On the other hand, this increase barely outpaced inflation and it is difficult to see any 
relationship between CDC capacity and changes in real-estate values at the neighborhood level. 
Critics argue that to the extent real-estate values have been revived, it is mostly because of public 
subsidies and risk sharing.28 
Market-rate development, rather than low-income housing, is particularly attractive for 
technocratic developers. For one thing, the CDCs already have the necessary skills in-house from 
years of hands-on experience doing tax-credit developments, either on their own or in 
partnership with CHN. They have established relationships with both banks (who chase these 
deals for Community Reinvestment Act credit) and private-sector developers (who chase these 
deals because if they are not allied with a CDC, they can have difficulty getting their project past 
City Council). There are many advantages of market-rate development for CDCs including 
credentialing as a real-estate developer, simpler deal structure, the collection of larger developer 
fees (as much as $10,000/unit whereas LIHTC rehab units yield $2,000-$4,000/unit), and 
perhaps an accelerated bump in local real-estate values which, in turn, is used as evidence to 
justify future funding.  
The market-driven logic of technocratic CDCs has little to say about existing populations 
who, too often, are viewed as barriers to a development that is meant to attract more affluent 
suburbanites. Existing residents need education and jobs more than amusement parks and 
townhouses. Staff and directors of technocratic CDCs often use the same language of community 
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development that has been around since the 1960s. However, the meaning of these terms has 
experienced a drastic slippage from that time. Neither the term “community” nor the term 
“development” refers any longer to identifiable social relations or a concrete group of people that 
conceive of themselves as a part of a common community. The understanding of these terms is 
rooted in the objectifying gaze of the planner rather than the living social relations of the pastor 
or the organizer. The notion of “community” in technocratic community development is tied to a 
geographic territory, but imagines that territory as filled with professional knowledge workers. 
“Development” of the “community” entails the physical improvement of the geographic place, a 
goal measured by growing real-estate values. To the extent that such CDCs have a conception of 
community that includes people, it refers to the future residents that are being targeted by the 
development strategy, not existing residents of the neighborhood. This is an attitude that is 
somewhat glaringly revealed by a CDC director who is a good deal more blunt than many in 
discussing those who feel CDCs should serve the existing population of the neighborhood. The 
comment also reveals the emphasis on priming the real-estate market:  
“One thing… I find striking… is that there is some small segment in each of these communities, an 
indigenous population, they fear change, they don’t necessarily like the investment that is coming in… 
Investment needs to be welcomed. There are those that think private-sector investment will come into an 
area of its own accord. No. Private-sector money has an ego too… And part of our job is throwing the door 
wide open to investment.29 
 
This is not to say that all existing neighborhood residents are ignored. Residents that 
positively contribute to the marketability of the neighborhood or its real-estate values are 
understood to have a lot of clout. On the other hand, such people rarely need assistance from 
nonprofits. As for other residents, they are treated not unlike old housing stock that can be 
rehabilitated and marketed to outsiders. They are not “renters” or “people in need;” they are 
potential homeowners. And indeed, development intermediaries and banks both work hard to 
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strip neighborhood residents of dispositions that are of little use in maximizing real-estate values, 
and inculcate new ones that can underpin the sale of a mortgage and create another homeowning 
“stakeholder.” This is accomplished in settings like street club meetings, which are usually 
organized by CDCs to encourage residents to work to improve and maintain neighborhoods. 
“Financial education” serves a similar purpose. Rather than teach people to understand credit, 
income, debt, and risk, these ubiquitous classes train people to improve their credit scores in 
order to qualify for a mortgage. 
By the time of the foreclosure crisis, Cleveland’s community development industry 
system had produced thousands of houses. Long-abandoned neighborhoods suddenly saw a 
bumper crop of new, tasteful, spacious housing emerge, apparently magically, from the ground. 
Typical is the case of Central, an impoverished African-American neighborhood on the city’s 
near East Side. Devastated by urban renewal in the 1960s, and seemingly capable of repelling 
any hint of investment ever since, between 2000 and 2004 the neighborhood was suddenly 
anchored by several hundred new homes designed for middle-class residents. The CDC that built 
the housing, Burten, Bell, Carr (BBC) had become one of the most proficient technocratic 
developers in the city (BBC’s ratio of production to budget and staff size indicate it was the most 
efficient community-based housing producer in the city). Suddenly, the neighborhood was no 
longer simply a sink for the city’s poverty. At the same time, even one of BBC’s most important 
supporters, Mayor Frank Jackson, questions whether the focus on capital-intensive 
redevelopment to raise real-estate values has only changed the “aesthetics” of neighborhoods 
without actually helping most of his ward’s impoverished residents.30 Nonetheless, the example 
is instructive. CDC activity was reshaping and rebuilding neighborhoods in ways that went 
beyond simply improving real-estate values or putting up large production numbers. CDCs were 
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making the city attractive to affluent suburbanites and professionals, and shaping the city itself in 
the process.  
At the same time, these very successes had important costs. The most important one was 
that CDCs increasingly focused on larger and more complicated development deals. The deals 
increased the legitimacy of organizations in the eyes of funders, potentially realized a diversity 
of policy goals, secured unrestricted funds in the form of developer’s fees, and, not least, rebuilt 
neighborhoods in a context of general urban decline. At the same time, these practices became so 
authoritative that organizations that resisted the isomorphic pressures of the field suffered as 
technocratic organizations became larger and more numerous. The diversity of the city’s civil 
society was declining as the organizational population revolved ever-more tightly around 
technocratic practices. It is to this process that I now turn.  
 
3. The Creation of a Civic Monoculture 
In 1990 there were some obvious fault lines among Cleveland’s CBOs, despite the core 
values most held in common. Nonetheless, by the foreclosure crisis this variety was in decline 
and technocratic CDCs were ascendant. Early in the development of the community 
development industry system a wide variety of organizations were able to thrive. In the 1980s 
and 1990s many CDCs were still led by veteran neighborhood activists or by allies of City 
Councilors. However, as funding was increasingly tied to a narrow set of programs and goals, 
leaders whose primary skill was in developing neighborhood and political social capital were 
replaced by executive directors who were trained in planning, finance, or real-estate 
development. As the essential terms and functions of community development as a political 
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technology were defined, the organizations that sustained it were rationalized around the singular 
goal of physical redevelopment. Some organizations died because they were starved of 
resources, others lost the institutional cover necessary to sustain a divergent course; some chose 
to imitate technocratic developers, and funders sometimes used resources to reward or punish 
organizations for their conformity with technocratic physical redevelopment practices. As 
organizational diversity declined, this singular focus was increasingly refined even as it became 
obviously disconnected from any identifiable urban problem. Organizations were losing their 
diversity and losing their connection to the neighborhoods they operated in, preventing them 
from being accountable to neighborhood residents who were experiencing changing conditions.31  
The most active agent furthering the rationalization of Cleveland’s civil society was the 
funding and professionalizing intermediary organization, Neighborhood Progress Inc. (NPI). NPI 
was started by the strategic business organization, Cleveland Tomorrow, in order to retail 
philanthropic funding from the city’s philanthropies while simultaneously using that funding to 
professionalize CDCs. Professionalization here meant training CDC staff in physical 
redevelopment, real-estate market dynamics, and organizational management. NPI funding is 
distributed competitively according to a variety of criteria, the most important of which were 
housing production and the development of strategic plans designed to increase the 
competitiveness of the city vis-à-vis the suburbs. For many organizations, NPI funding is the 
most stable source of operational funding available. Prior to the foreclosure crisis most CDC 
executive directors took it as an article of faith that good production numbers would result in 
support from NPI.32 The importance of NPI was magnified by the fact that, by 2000, the city 
Department of Community Development had accepted most of NPI’s criteria for its own 
funding. NPI was the most important factor in transforming a bunch of disparate community-
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based organizations with a variety of interests and programs into organized engines of physical 
redevelopment. At the same time, NPI defined authoritative community development practices 
that, in turn, defined the norms against which organizations would be evaluated. Of course, NPI 
was not the only source of the rationalization of the CBO population. Early community 
developers with more diverse skills and conceptions of community development were replaced, 
some organizations attempted to mimic the CBOs that were celebrated by funders, others were 
merged into organizations that were viewed as models by Councilors or NPI. Some organizations 
were starved of resources if they attempted to maintain a divergent path, or were otherwise 
coerced into changing.33 The case of St. Clair-Superior illustrates some of these processes.  
In 2000, the St. Clair Superior Coalition was the last legacy of the Backyard Revolution. 
It survived by cobbling together funding from a variety of sources to stay alive while preserving 
its core goal of providing a venue for neighborhood deliberation and voice. The organization did 
some work on environmental and public-safety issues and managed to secure a revolving-door 
fund from a long-time ally to do some housing rehabilitation. At the same time, the organization 
preserved a hostility to NPI’s development agenda, businesses, and local politicians—feeling, as 
many CBOs did in the 1970s, that they were not legitimate voices of the neighborhood. The 
Coalition was encouraged by its funders to merge with the neighborhood business association, 
even though the two organizations had been openly hostile in the 1970s and 1980s. Ominously 
for neighborhood activists, the merger diluted the power of the veterans of the Congresses on the 
organization’s board. As a neighborhood organization, rather than a ward organization, the 
footprint of St. Clair Superior intersected with three wards, but the organization only received 
support from one Councilor, Joe Cimperman, a pro-business, pro-development Democrat. 
Around the time of the problematic merger with the business association, Cimperman told the 
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organization he was withdrawing support if the Coalition did not change tack. Leaders of the 
organization felt it was a typical story of the Councilor being resentful of the organization’s lack 
of deference to his authority; however, Cimperman was also part of a new generation of 
Councilors who supported the technocratic approach to community development. With the 
blessing and support of NPI and a board that, thanks to the merger with the business association, 
now had a number of pro-development members, a new executive director, Diane Swander, was 
installed to pursue that agenda. A veteran of development banking, Swander equated “wealth 
with power” and wanted to pursue an agenda to attract investment to the neighborhood. Swander 
was apparently baffled by the idea that deliberation could yield anything productive. Apparently 
unaware she was dealing with a board that equated “people with power”, the organization 
experienced a civil war between 2003 and 2005. The outcome was ultimately that Swander and 
many veterans of the Congresses resigned their positions. In the aftermath the organization was 
taken over by another executive director who pursued a business- and real-estate development 
agenda and had little use for making the organization a forum and tool for neighborhood 
residents. The organization was renamed the St. Clair Superior Development Corporation.34 In a 
pitch to tourists and local foodies, it has succeeded in renaming the neighborhood “Little Asia”.  
By 2000 technocratic CDCs were noticeably larger in terms of staff size and budget than 
other CDCs and were less likely to die in any given year. More importantly, their practices were 
recognized as the industry standard by most funders and even most CDCs. Because the 
stakeholders in the community development industry system thought physical redevelopment 
was necessary to solve neighborhood problems beyond housing, these organizations increasingly 
captured private- and public-sector funding for a host of neighborhood issues even as their 
programmatic activities narrowed. At the same time, they became increasingly disconnected 
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from the neighborhoods they operated in. Organizations were run by experts and the assumption 
that physical redevelopment was the cure-all for neighborhood problems meant there was little 
need to consult with neighborhood residents.  
Of course, if there were many different types of CBO around, the elimination of such 
deliberation from technocratic CDCs would not be significant. But as technocratic CDCs have 
come to dominate the landscape of the city’s civil society, their narrow, instrumental practices 
have more far-reaching implications. Community-based organizations that had taken a holistic 
and participatory approach to dealing with neighborhood issues were supplanted by narrower, 
more rationalized, organizations of experts. In the process, the adaptability, diversity, and 
flexibility of Cleveland’s civil society were drained out of it.  
The foreclosure crisis in Cleveland was more of a slowly deteriorating situation than a 
sudden popping of a bubble. In 1999, before the dot-com bubble burst, Cuyahoga experienced 
five thousand foreclosures (see Figure 2). In 2004, the year that Cleveland was declared the 
poorest big city in the United States by the Census Bureau, Cuyahoga County experienced nearly 
ten thousand foreclosures.  The issue was put starkly by the Cleveland State professor and 
housing expert, Tom Bier, who noted in an interview in 2002 that Cleveland had over four 
thousand foreclosures that year.35 In such a context, he estimated that the community 
development industry would have to multiply its production tenfold (to six thousand) to have a 
positive impact on real estate values.  
CDCs were not just becoming less connected to neighborhood residents; they were 
increasingly disconnected from neighborhood problems as well. Even as foreclosures accelerated 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many community developers were optimistic about the 
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possibility of reversing the city’s decline through physical redevelopment. Perhaps most starkly, 
an intermediary organization official, who had actually been a community organizer in the 
1970s, was asked point blank in 2004 if real-estate market valorization through housing 
production was still a viable strategy. The response was an unequivocal “yes.”36 The optimism of 
community developers increasingly resembled blind faith.  
This is not to say that community developers were merely imitating a static set of 
practices. Perhaps recognizing this essential problem, NPI began modifying its funding criteria 
as foreclosures worsened. CDCs and NPI began concentrating investments in strategic 
investment areas. Like the Strategic Hamlets in the Vietnam War, which moved villagers into 
fortified compounds to cut them off from insurgents, these strategic investment areas would be 
fortified by concentrated investment against broader processes of decline. Eventually they would 
be a launching pad for expanding the territory of revalorization. But this and other innovations 
made by the city’s community developers did not solve the basic problem of disconnection from 
neighborhood residents and problems.  
 
Figure 2 About Here 
 
 Both growing disconnection and the ongoing obsession with keeping the housing 
production pipeline full were on display in 2003. Cleveland’s foreclosure crisis was already real, 
there had been nearly nine thousand foreclosures in Cuyahoga County in 2002. In response, the 
president of City Council, Frank Jackson, was sponsoring legislation that would spend a small 
portion of the city’s CDBG allocation on foreclosure counseling as part of an initial effort to aid 
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distressed homeowners. Apparently outraged by this effort to spend community development 
dollars on something other than physical redevelopment, staff from numerous CDCs showed up 
at a committee hearing to protest the legislation. According to a City Councilor allied with 
Jackson, CDC staff argued that such counseling, coming at the expense of CDC funding which 
would support physical redevelopment, was a misallocation of resources.37 While the event was 
a dramatic demonstration of how Cleveland’s civil society had been reorganized over the 
previous thirty years, the attitude that it revealed was not unusual; in fact, it was prevalent.  
 The resistance of CDC staff to foreclosure counseling in 2003 is a startling indicator of 
how invested they were in community development as a political technology rather than as a 
solution to neighborhood problems. It is even more surprising when we consider that the very 
activity of CDCs helped lay the groundwork for predatory practices, a dynamic which would 
seem to call for more regulation to protect well-intended efforts from exploitation by predators. 
As community developers built more expensive housing in the name of inflating all-important 
real-estate values, they also attracted speculators and flippers who would do minimal work 
before selling a property. More extreme predators were also attracted to the equity of the city’s 
neighborhoods. Inflated loans with high interest rates were marketed to the poor and people of 
color. A predatory practice more characteristic of Cleveland arises from the fact that the city is 
home to many retirees who live in older and deteriorating housing stock. Faced with diminished 
pensions and more expensive upkeep, the elderly often have difficulty maintaining their 
property. However, despite being cash-poor, elderly Clevelanders were equity-rich, and were 
becoming more equity-rich due to CDC activity, a circumstance that enabled the refinancing 
scam. Home equity loans were sold to equity-rich Clevelanders on highly unfavorable terms. 
Often this scam would be paired with charging residents up front for maintenance work that was 
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never completed. The activity of Cleveland’s community development political technology 
effectively created or uncovered valuable veins of equity that could be mined by the 
unscrupulous. The effect was to drain hundreds of millions of dollars in equity out of 
Cleveland’s neighborhoods. CDCs were not the culprits, but they helped create the conditions 
that enabled predatory practices and they did little to mitigate the problem, blinded as they were 
by their faith in their ability to build their way out of any difficulty.  
 The emphasis on physical redevelopment ensured that CBOs with very different 
orientations and goals could participate in the city’s political technology. However, it ultimately 
privileged the technocratic developers who were most efficient and most proficient at 
production. These organizations became the model organizations for the population. Funding and 
authority in the field increasingly reflected the particularity of this subset of CBOs and defined 
the center of gravity around which isomorphic processes would narrow the overall population. 
Technocratic CDCs are not always the largest organizations in the field, but they are the most 
likely to survive and by 2000 the most numerous. This expansion came at the expense of CDCs 
that have a more holistic approach to community development, a more diverse programmatic 
agenda, or, as with clientelist CDCs, less attachment to the idea that real-estate values are both 
the appropriate metric of community development and desired outcome. Some of the most 
sophisticated and programmatically diverse CBOs continued to grow, but at the same time, by 
the time of the foreclosure crisis, clientelist CDCs had been eliminated from the field.  
While there were conscious efforts to rationalize the field around capital-intensive real 
estate development, and while the persistent assumption that physical redevelopment could solve 
neighborhood problems seems cynical in light of what was going on in Cleveland’s 
neighborhoods, such overt and intentional efforts do not by themselves explain the 
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rationalization of the field. Not all organizations were eliminated by intentional effort and even 
well-meaning organizations fell victim to the trap of physical redevelopment due to enticing 
developer’s fees and the dramatic successes that development can sometimes yield. The 
problems ran deeper and were often of a more passive nature. As CBOs became increasingly 
invested in physical redevelopment they also tended to become disconnected from the 
stakeholders in the neighborhoods they operated in. This was not always the case, there are 
exceptions, but it was a tendency.  
This problem was magnified by the fact that physical redevelopment was, over time, 
becoming a solution in search of a problem. By 2007 it was clear that much CDC development 
activity was actually contributing to the problems that were emerging in neighborhoods, not 
solving them. This problem could have been corrected if organizations remained accountable to 
neighborhoods, but by 2000 there were very few such organizations and, indeed, clientelist 
CDCs would be wiped out by the foreclosure crisis itself. Finally, this problem could have 
plausibly been averted if Cleveland’s CBOs had sustained a diversity of organizational models 
and practices. In that case, when the crisis hit it might have been the case that previously 
marginalized organizations and practices would have reemerged in the new environment. 
Unfortunately, most of the diversity had been rationalized out of the population by a combination 
of incentives, imitation, and coercion. The fact that the uses of physical redevelopment had 
become an unchallenged matter of faith among community developers ensured that Cleveland’s 
CBOs would be paralyzed by foreclosures. By 2007, Cleveland’s civil society had become a 
civic monoculture well-adapted to a fictional environment.  
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4. Rationalized Civil Society and the Foreclosure Crisis 
When asked about the ability of Cleveland’s community development industry to deal 
with the city’s problems, many practitioners cite an industry shibboleth, the “but-for” argument: 
Without community developers actively working to revalorize real estate, the situation in 
Cleveland would be much worse.38 This seems like a valid argument and the image that is 
conjured up is of community developers sticking their fingers in dikes in order to hold back a 
wave of disinvestment threatening Cleveland’s neighborhoods. In a context of a diverse civil 
society, this might be a valid argument. However, the process described here is not simply one of 
the growth and professionalization of Cleveland’s community development system, it is of the 
transformation of that system into a political technology that dissolves conflicts and sucks up 
resources from other activities. Cleveland’s community development industry system has come 
to define all problems in terms of physical redevelopment and real-estate valorization leaving 
little discursive room, much less material resources, for other solutions to the crisis. Not only 
was the adaptability of individual CDCs undermined in this process, the adaptability of the city’s 
civil society as a whole was undermined.  
Unlike the hurricane that hit New Orleans, the one that hit Cleveland brought a wave of 
paper devalorization that had effects strikingly similar to the wind and rain of Katrina. Just as the 
poorly-maintained dikes and pumps of New Orleans made that city vulnerable, terrible public 
policy, combined with a community development field that understood real-estate markets to be 
a solution to neighborhood problems, made Cleveland especially vulnerable to foreclosure. 
Attending real-estate auctions as the crisis peaked, one would see chipper and enthusiastic 
auctioneers, all seemingly of wholesome Midwestern stock, become slowly overwhelmed by the 
sheer human tragedy entailed in their work as they attempted to sell inner-city houses for $5,000 
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and suburban ranch houses for $35,000, houses that had sold for $70,000 and $125,000 a few 
short years before. In 2009 the city estimated that ten thousand houses, or one in thirteen, were 
vacant. The county treasurer, Jim Rokakis, told a journalist the number was more likely fifteen 
thousand.39 Rather than continue to invest in maintaining this physical capital in the hopes of an 
urban renaissance, the city has waved the white flag and is now engaged in a program of mass 
housing demolitions, though the need for demolitions far outstrips the resources available to 
meet it. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 In June 2008, the moment when the crisis was becoming a national issue, Cleveland had 
the 11th-highest foreclosure rate of all Community Development Block Grant jurisdictions (see 
Table 1). Among large cities with diverse economies, Cleveland only ranked behind Newark, NJ. 
Cleveland was riding the initial wave of foreclosures even as cities that would later become 
associated with the crisis, such as Las Vegas and Stockton, were barely registering half of 
Cleveland’s rate. In the forefront of the foreclosure crisis, Cleveland was keeping company with 
Florida communities that had seen the most excessive real-estate speculation, a few declining 
manufacturing cities, and some highly-segregated and poor suburbs like East Cleveland, East St. 
Louis, and Camden. With the exception of the cities in Florida, the early victims of the 
foreclosure crisis were cities with large minority populations and cities that had seen their 
heyday when American manufacturing was central to the economy. In other words, in the early 
months of the crisis mass foreclosures were a symptom of ongoing economic decline, although 
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that alone does not account for the depth of the crisis in Cleveland, Cleveland’s foreclosure rate 
was far higher than cities like Memphis and Detroit. Later, many cities would overtake 
Cleveland’s foreclosure rate, particularly cities that came late to the speculative boom, but the 
crisis in those latecomer cities was usually related to urban growth, sprawl, and speculation more 
than urban decline. 
 What is surprising is the extreme nature of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland. It is 
certainly true that the city’s decline accelerated over the last decade (using population as the 
measure). Nonetheless, compared to many other Midwestern cities, Cleveland appeared to be 
much better prepared to handle the crisis. Most obviously, Cleveland possessed a community 
development industry system that was one of the most innovative and sophisticated in the 
country.40 According to an Urban Institute study, the system in Cleveland had capacity 
equivalent to systems in much larger cities such as Boston, Chicago, and Washington D.C. and 
was ranked the seventh-best in the country in 1991. Cleveland’s community developers could 
boast a track record of innovative practices, extensive support from national intermediaries and 
wealthy philanthropies, and excellent local policy tools. Cleveland has a long history of public-
private partnerships to facilitate economic and community development and, according to some, 
is a city distinguished by its active and interventionist civic culture.41 Cleveland’s civil society 
appeared on paper to be exceptionally well-prepared to deal with any crisis that originated in 
housing markets. 
 Yet, by June 2008 Cleveland’s community development industry system was paralyzed. 
CDCs could not produce housing that recovered the costs of production and some CDCs were 
dependent upon city-subsidized development to stay afloat. One of the most notable and 
celebrated innovations made in Cleveland was to develop an elaborate information gathering and 
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processing system to keep track of distressed properties so that as soon as foreclosure happened 
the property could be transferred to community developers. This entailed developing a large data 
warehousing system and negotiating deals with banks to turn over property in bulk to the city’s 
land bank. Nonetheless, while these successes are significant demonstrations of the adaptive 
capacity of community developers, they also tell us much about the nature of community 
development in Cleveland. Most obviously, the focus of their attention is on the preservation of 
physical capital. Despite sophisticated tools such as new data gathering and warehousing 
systems, an increasing mastery and sophistication about the foreclosure process itself,42 and 
extensive support from local politicians, community developers had no tools that were able to 
effectively keep people in their homes.  
This paralysis is indicated by one of the more celebrated responses to the contemporary 
foreclosure crisis, the “blue man” project, in which one of the city’s best CDCs organized 
neighborhood residents to paint window sashes and planters on boarded windows and a waving 
“blue man” in boarded doorways. While certainly a nice demonstration of community spirit in 
the face of the foreclosure hurricane, when it is one of the only programmatic responses to mass 
foreclosure available, things are pretty bleak. Moreover, while the threat was real to the 
investments CDCs were making in neighborhood physical capital, the lack of attention to the 
occupants of houses is notable. It is not simply a failure to see human capital as a resource 
necessary to sustain functioning communities as a resource, it is that this blindness persists 
despite the fact that the most effective way to preserve physical capital is to keep people in their 
homes. The inattention of CDCs to neighborhood residents and their needs is a studied 
avoidance, not an absent-minded oversight.  
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  At the same time, Cleveland’s civil society has been stirring. There are occasional efforts 
to revive community organizing in the city, though almost all are unsuccessful. An exception is 
the East Side Organizing Project (ESOP). Led by Mark Seifert and Inez Killingsworth, the 
former a professional organizer and the latter a long-time neighborhood activist who is a veteran 
of the 1970s protests, ESOP utilizes confrontational tactics to force banks to modify loans. 
Combining protest with a variety of policy tools, ESOP achieves 80% loan workout rates even 
while federal programs have a success rate of 20%. In contrast to community developers, the 
organization actually assists homeowners that are victimized in the foreclosure crisis. Despite its 
successes, ESOP has consistently been a marginalized organization ignored by funders and 
politicians. After a protest at the home of then-mayor Mike White’s girlfriend, ESOP lost its 
funding and it has remained in the doghouse of the city’s philanthropies and politicians ever 
since. The fortunes of the organization changed with the foreclosure crisis. ESOP managed to 
fund itself and expand statewide using memorandums of understanding with targeted banks and 
mortgage servicers, limiting the organization’s reliance on hostile community foundations. The 
organization now boasts ten offices around the state and a multi-million dollar budget. Seifert 
argues that ESOP is not really any different than it was in 1999 when he was the only staffer, and 
a poorly-paid one at that. The environment changed, not the organization.43 
If Cleveland’s CDCs are poorly adapted to an environment of mass foreclosures, ESOP is 
built to thrive in such a context, just as the reverse was true in an environment of loose credit and 
growing real-estate values. Yet to other organizations ESOP is not an example of successful 
response to foreclosure, but of the dangers and incivility of confrontational approaches to solving 
problems. Seifert thinks that in the midst of a crisis his organization’s confrontational tactics 
should be considered “mainstream.”44 ESOP can be understood as an example of the vibrancy of 
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Cleveland’s civil society, but it is really the exception that proves the rule. The fact that ESOP 
continues to be starved of philanthropic resources, while community developers garner not just 
funding but subsidies, indicates just how radically the city’s civil society has been distorted by 
the political technology of community development. In 2011 recognition of this fact has 
apparently emerged among the city’s community developers. NPI has begun developing 
strategies and tools that do not rely upon capital-intensive physical redevelopment. Ten years too 
late, NPI has acknowledged that its model has failed, yet it still receives the bulk of local 
philanthropic funding for community development.   
 While ESOP was thriving, Cleveland’s CDCs were on life support. Housing production 
had become the engine that sustained the organizations by justifying funding, delivering 
developer’s fees, and enabling other programmatic activities. CDC staff had come to understand 
neighborhood problems and solutions through the lens of real-estate values and capital-intensive 
physical redevelopment. Yet when the city’s real-estate market collapsed many CDCs were stuck 
with unsold housing stock, presenting a threat to the cash flow of the organizations. More 
importantly, many were unable to produce housing that could actually be sold profitably. For 
decades community developers had been shifting their product up-market, partially because it 
was more profitable, partially to take advantage of policies that supported homeownership, and 
partially because the effect on real-estate values was understood to be greater. As a consequence, 
they were inexpert in less capital-intensive interventions. It was in this context that the “blue-
man project” could be seen as a helpful program while analytically revealing the paralysis of the 
community development political technology.  
 It appeared that a number of CDCs would die as a result of the foreclosure crisis and 
indeed a number did. Interestingly, it was not the organizations that were most invested in 
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technocratic approaches to community development that were dying, it was the remaining 
clientelist CDCs who were closely tied to the electoral operations of ward-based politicians.  
How did the technocratic CDCs survive? The city subsidized them. Perhaps in the name of 
receiving less bang for more buck, the city paid the growing difference between costs of 
production and the sales price of CDC product in order to enable the organizations to live to fight 
another day. This despite the fact that the city did not have enough money to meet the need for 
housing demolitions—a policy with a recognized impact on neighborhood well-being. Rather 
than providing a new, more responsive, more efficient mode of providing housing that was less 
reliant on taxpayer financing, nonprofit housing producers in Cleveland had become wards of the 
state. The roles of civic patient and doctor have been reversed. The rationalization of Cleveland’s 
civil society around the imperatives of the political technology of community development 
created a civic monoculture that was disconnected from neighborhood needs and poorly adapted 
to deal with the foreclosure crisis. Despite this, they continue to garner resources from both the 
taxpayers and philanthropies.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 The idea that civil society can act as an important counterweight to states and economic 
organizations is prominent among thinkers as diverse as Tocqueville, Polanyi, and Putnam.45 
Since the 1960s thinkers on both the left and the right have proposed that civil society could play 
a larger role in governance, thus bringing decision-making and programmatic implementation 
closer to citizens.46 Civil society was valorized in many movements as a source of democratic 
authenticity, an idea that was prominent in Cleveland’s Backyard Revolution. These ideas have a 
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great deal of validity, but they are analytically burdened by an excess of optimism. Most 
importantly, since civil society has been revalorized in politics because of the success of 
movements like the Backyard Revolution, state and economic actors have turned to the sector to 
achieve their goals. As a result, civil-society organizations are increasingly shaped by political 
and economic institutional logics that organize competition among them and that drive 
isomorphic and rationalizing processes in their populations. While fields of organizations 
mediate these logics and open space for more authentic values and goals, rationalizing processes 
can undermine this mediation over time. This is what occurred in Cleveland as the city’s civil 
society went from being the basis of a neighborhood protest movement to being the basis for the 
creation of a community development political technology that left the city vulnerable to its 
biggest challenge in forty years. When the foreclosure crisis struck with full force in 2007, 
Cleveland’s community developers built on their expertise with transforming unoccupied and 
dilapidated properties into new physical capital, but this response was poorly geared to actually 
meeting the most pressing needs of neighborhoods, ignored the needs of neighborhood residents, 
and had an unrealistic understanding of the potential of nonprofit-based physical redevelopment 
to be successful in a context of mass foreclosures. 
The polite question that this outcome raises is how Cleveland’s community-based 
organizations could be so completely ineffective in response. The impolite question is whether 
the structure and organization of the city’s civil society actually contributed to making the 
foreclosure crisis in Cleveland worse than it otherwise might have been. Analytically, the case 
suggests, first, that the romanticization of civil society is counterproductive and that instead we 
should pay more attention to the institutional logics that are shaping fields of civil-society 
organizations. Moreover, it suggests that civil-society organizations can facilitate neoliberal 
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institutional transformations as much as mitigate or protest them. Finally, it suggests that the 
specific utility of civil-society organizations, their authenticity, their diversity, their value-driven 
missions make them valuable not just in opposition to states and firms, but as a tool for them. 
Governments and firms in Cleveland use civil society organizations to solve dilemmas of 
governance and authority that emerged in the 1970s. In this context, struggles that had been 
waged in the streets and in newspapers moved indoors and became struggles to define the 
meaning and practices of civil society itself. In Cleveland, both state and private actors 
instrumentalized civil society, altering the basic logic of organizational growth and survival. 
While not immediately noticeable, though some neighborhood activists certainly suspected this 
outcome, the effect was eventually to rationalize the city’s civil society around the need to 
sustain a political technology that secured political peace in the context of decline. By 2008, 
isomorphic processes had produced a civic monoculture of well-meaning CDCs that were 
disconnected from the city’s citizens and neighborhood problems. In the crisis of the 1970s, 
Cleveland’s combative CBOs had challenged political and corporate leaders both locally and 
nationally. They had sustained a neighborhood-based counterpublic and, in conjunction with a 
broader neighborhood movement, prompted the passage of national legislation to limit the 
mobility of capital and prevent neighborhood disinvestment. By 2008, the city’s civil society had 
become an anchor weighing on neighborhoods as they weathered the foreclosure storm. 
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Tables and Figures: 
CDBG 
Jurisdictions 
>10% 
foreclosure 
rate 
%Loans in 
Foreclosure, 
June 2008 
%Loans 
+30 Days 
Delinquent, 
June 2008 
%Loans 
Subprime, 
June 2008 
Population 
(2010) 
Population 
Change, 
2000-2010 
%White Median 
Household 
Income, 
2006-2010 
Cape Coral, FL 16.58 10.05 19.53 154,305 50.9 88.2 52,671 
Gary, IN 14.96 20.30 50.15 80,294 -21.9 10.7 27,846 
East Cleveland, 
OH 
14.47 17.20 46.76 17,843 -34.4 4.6 21,219 
Newark, NJ 13.28 13.76 32.52 277,140 1.3 26.3 35,659 
East St. Louis, 
IL 
13.27 25.42 58.03 27,006 -14.4 0.9 20,386 
Irvington, NJ 13.17 17.38 36.57 58,920 N.A. 3.6 N.A. 
Youngstown, 
OH 
12.92 13.40 35.02 66,982 -18.3 47.0 24,318 
Ft. Myers, FL 11.66 9.22 17.56 62,298 29.2 54.6 37,793 
East Orange, 
NJ 
11.38 16.13 35.71 64,270 -8.0 4.1 40,358 
Port St. Lucie, 
FL 
11.31 10.44 20.00 164,603 85.4 74.3 49,657 
Cleveland, OH 11.24 13.90 35.58 396,815 -17.1 37.3 27,349 
Elizabeth, NJ 11.18 9.85 22.64 124,969 3.7 54.6 43,770 
East Chicago, 
IN 
10.69 13.63 29.95 29,698 -8.4 35.5 28,999 
Camden, NJ 10.50 18.12 39.82 77,344 -3.2 17.6 27,027 
Paterson, NJ 10.07 11.77 26.86 146,199 -2.0 34.7 34,086 
Other Cities of 
Interest 
       
Cleveland, OH 11.24 13.90 35.58 396,815 -17.1 37.3 27,349 
Detroit, MI 8.96 24.09 54.2 713,777 -25.0 10.6 28,357 
Memphis, TN 8.77 16.06 26.18 646,889 -0.5 29.4 36,473 
Stockton, CA 7.59 10.19 24.27 291,707 19.7 37.0 47,946 
Las Vegas, NV 5.82 9.81 22.51 583,756 22.0 62.1 54,334 
Pittsburgh, PA 4.44 8.95 17.14 305,704 -8.6 66.0 36,019 
 
Table 1: Foreclosure Rates by CDBG Jurisdiction at the beginning of the foreclosure crisis. Source: Center 
for Housing Policy. 
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Figure 1. Cleveland CDC Population, 1970-2010. Sources: City of Cleveland Department of Community 
Development, Cleveland Neighborhood Development Coalition, Neighborhood Progress Inc., and interviews.  
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Figure 2. Cuyahoga County Foreclosures. Source: Policy Matters Ohio.  
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